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Given the proliferation of cataclysmic predictions about antibiotic resistance, cases of which are estimated to amount to 12 500 
per year in France, we herein decided to compare the empirical clinical microbiology data from our institution with estimates and 
predictions from 10 major international scientific articles and reports. The analysis of 7 years of antibiotic resistance data from 10 
bacterial species and genera of clinical interest from our institution identified no deaths that were directly attributable to extremely 
drug-resistant bacteria. By comparing our observations to the 10 articles and reports studied herein, we concluded that their results 
lack empirical data. Interventions are urgently needed to significantly reduce both mortality and the healthcare costs associated with 
bacterial infections, including the implementation of local and national laboratory data–based surveillance systems for the routine 
surveillance of antibiotic resistance that would be helpful for a better understanding of how to manage antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
in the future.
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In recent decades, major technological improvements have 
emerged around the world, particularly through the massive 
spread of the internet. It was recently estimated that of the 7.3 
billion human beings worldwide as of June 2016, >3.6 billion 
(49.5% of the world’s population) have access to and actively 
use the internet (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.
htm). This impressive development accelerates the sharing of 
a diverse range of information, including health-related infor-
mation. One of the main problems associated with this sharing 
is that individuals can distort or skew the information based on 
their perceptions and preconceived ideas about a given event, 
which can create panic among the population [1]. Therefore, 
the way information is communicated to the public is of critical 
importance.
In recent years, we have seen the proliferation of cataclysmic 
predictions about human health that, fortunately, have never 
fully materialized. These include, in particular, bioterrorism, 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), the H5N1 and H7N9 influenza viruses, Middle East res-
piratory syndrome (MERS), and Ebola. These infectious threats 
have killed hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of people, but 
the death toll remains far from the million deaths per year due 
to tuberculosis (1.1 million in 2015) [2], and far from the 29 000 
and 15 000 estimated annual deaths due to Clostridium difficile 
in the United States and Europe, respectively [3, 4]. This dispro-
portional reaction is particularly observable in Table 1.
The new fear that is currently taking control around the 
world is antibiotic resistance, and its purportedly huge impact 
on humans. Over the last decade, resistance to antibiotics has 
become a new fear, both within the scientific community and 
in the media, leading to several alarmist reports of the potential 
inability to treat patients in the future [5–14] (Table 2), and as 
many as 10 million extra human deaths per year by 2050 [9]. 
This raises the question of whether we urgently need to develop 
new antibiotics to maintain the efficacy in the treatment of 
infectious diseases [15] and/or whether these alarmist reports 
represent the reality of clinical practice.
Given the importance of the issue, the Institut Hospitalo-
Universitaire Méditerranée Infection (IHU) has implemented 
its own empirical bacterial antibiotic-resistance surveillance 
systems [16, 17] to provide a strong foundation for discussions 
on the subject, rather than being based on predictions deriving 
from mathematical models that have yet to succeed in predict-
ing the evolution of any other infectious risks [18–20]. In this 
investigation, we compare the empirical data available from the 
IHU bacterial antibiotic-resistance surveillance network with 
the estimates and predictions from various articles and reports 
[5–14] (Table 2).
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EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
The Global Burden of Disease study group recently published a 
systematic analysis of the number of deaths due to 249 causes 
of death, in which they identified that the worldwide number 
of human deaths due to infectious diseases has dramatically 
decreased from 10.7 million deaths in 2005 to 8.6 million 
in 2015 [2]. This is in stark contrast to the global fear about 
the resurgence of infectious diseases. In particular, this study 
underlines that the number of global deaths due to lower res-
piratory infections, which were classified as the leading cause of 
human death in 1990, and which were the third leading cause 
of human death in 2015, has decreased from 2.8 million deaths 
in 2005 to 2.7 million in 2015—that is, a 3.6% decrease over the 
last 10 years [2]. The decrease is even more striking in children 
<5 years of age, for whom a 36.9% decrease was observed over 
the same period [2]. Such observations can be partly explained 
by improved management of the patients in hospital settings, 
particularly by the screening and isolation strategies that were 
developed to control specific pathogens such as methicillin-re-
sistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [21]. However, as pre-
viously discussed [21], other factors have to be considered, in 
particular the discovery and worldwide spread of antibiotic 
compounds [15], which continues to grow, with a 36% increase 
in the worldwide human consumption of antibiotics between 
2000 and 2010 [12]. Thus, one of the best-known positive 
impacts of antibiotics on human health is the introduction in 
the 1940s of antituberculosis medicines, which contributed to 
the dramatic decrease in worldwide prevalence and mortality 
of tuberculosis [22]. This decrease is still observable today, with 
a drop from 1.3 million deaths in 2005 to 1.1 million deaths 
in 2015—that is, an impressive 15.4% decrease over the last 10 
years [2]—and an estimated 47% decrease between 1990 and 
2015 (http://www.who.int/gho/tb/epidemic/cases_deaths/en/). 
Another example is the impact of penicillin on pneumonia, 
which was highlighted by a dramatic decrease from 20%–40% 
to 5% in the worldwide mortality rate for pneumococcal pneu-
monia over the last 8 decades [12].
OBSERVATIONS FROM MARSEILLE
The IHU surveillance system network includes 4 automated 
laboratory data–based surveillance systems: epidemiological 
surveillance and alert based on microbiological data (EPIMIC), 
established in 2002 [16], and the bacterial real-time labo-
ratory-based surveillance system (BALYSES), the Marseille 
antibiotic resistance surveillance system (MARSS), and the 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur surveillance epidemiologic sys-
tem (PACASurvE), established in 2013 [17, 23]. EPIMIC, 
BALYSES, and MARSS analyze data produced by the Timone 
hospital clinical microbiology laboratory on a weekly basis, and 
PACASurvE analyzes data produced by 214 microbiology lab-
oratories from France’s Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) 
region on a weekly basis. In combination, these surveillance 
systems make it possible to monitor the weekly number of 
patients where >650 bacterial species were isolated from clin-
ical human samples collected and cultured in the 4 Assistance 
Publique–Hôpitaux de Marseille public hospitals.
Of these surveillance systems, EPIMIC and MARSS moni-
tor weekly bacterial antibiotic resistance profiles (39 antibiotic 
Table 1. Number of Articles Published in PubMed, Number of Deaths, and Number of Deaths/Number of Publications Ratios for Bioterrorism, Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy, Avian Flu H5N1 and H7N9, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Ebola, Tuberculosis, and 
Clostridium difficile
Keywords for PubMed 
Research
No. of Articles Published in 
PubMeda
Peak of Publication 
(Year) No. of Deaths
Deaths/Publications 
Ratiob References
Bioterrorism 5808 889 (2002) 5c 0.001 Jernigan et al, 2002; Gursky et al, 2003 
[33, 34]
Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy
3559 278 (2001) 224 0.1 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
factsheets/fs180/en/
H5N1 6858 754 (2009) 362 0.1 McConnell and Raoult, 2014 [35]
H7N9 7898 789 (2014) 44 0.01 McConnell and Raoult, 2014 [35]
SARS 7811 1157 (2003) 774 0.1 McConnell and Raoult, 2014 [35]
MERS 13 328 1496 (2003) 60 0.005 McConnell and Raoult, 2014 [35]
Ebola 5902 1904 (2015) 11 315 1.9 http://apps.who.int/ebola/ 
current-situation/ 
ebola-situation-report-6-january-2016
Tuberculosis 231 313 (6723 in 2016) 7599 (2015) 1.1 million per year 163.6 GBD 2015 Mortality and Causes of Death 
Collaborators, 2016
Clostridium difficile 11 720 (1070 in 2016) 1082 (2015) At least 44 000 per 
year
41.1 Barbut et al, 2013; Lessa et al, 2015 [3, 4]
Abbreviations: GBD, Global Burden of Disease Study; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
aNumber of articles published in PubMed up to 18 November 2016.
bRatios calculated by dividing the number of deaths due to each infectious disease of interest to the total number of publications available in PubMed. Only publications related to bioterror-
ism events involving infectious agents were included in the calculation. For tuberculosis and C. difficile, we used the number of publications of 2016 to estimate the deaths/publications ratio.
cHuman deaths due to anthrax.
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resistance patterns for EPIMIC and 65 antibiotic-resistance pro-
files for 15 bacterial species of interest to MARSS) [16, 17]. Since 
2010, they have monitored the results of >140 000 bacterial anti-
biotic resistance tests—that is, the results of >25 000 antibiotic 
resistance test per year. This 15-year experiment has tracked 
intriguing epidemiological events. For example, we identified 
that the level of MRSA strains routinely isolated in hospitals in 
Marseille dramatically decreased over the years, particularly 
invasive strains, for which the level of MRSA decreased from 
27.4% in 2010 to 12.8% in 2015, for unexplained reasons [21]. 
A comparison of our level of MRSA to European data from the 
European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network and 
available international literature shows that this phenomenon 
is, in fact, a worldwide unexplained epidemiological event [21], 
emphasizing that the bacterial epidemiology is evolving, par-
ticularly through the continuous appearance and disappearance 
of bacterial clones that are more competitive. This phenomenon 
has been observed several times in the past, and was recently 
observed with the appearance and worldwide spread of the 
Escherichia coli sequence type 131 clone [24]. Our monitoring 
system has also enabled us to see that the level of resistance to 
some critical antibiotics (including vancomycin and imipenem) 
of invasive strains belonging to 11 bacterial species of par-
ticular clinical interest (Enterobacter cloacae, Escherichia coli, 
Table 2. Sources of Data Compared in Our Study
Source of Data Description of the Analysis Studied Pathogens/Antibiotic Profiles
Number of 
Extra Deaths 
(Region)a References
Institut Hospitalo- 
Universitaire 
Méditerranée 
Infection
Retrospective analysis of 27 681 
nonredundant bacterial infec-
tions using real clinical microbi-
ology data
Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Enterobacter cloacae, 
Enterobacter aerogenes, Burkholderia cepacia, 
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Proteus spp, Serratia 
spp, and Morganella morganii
0 (Marseille, 
France)
Unpublished data
World Health 
Organization report
Estimate based on the analysis  
of 221 studies
MRSA, 3GC, and fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli, and 
3GC and CR K. pneumoniae
NC World Health Organization, 
2014
European Centre for 
Disease Prevention 
and Control report
Estimates based on data from 
the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System
MRSA, VISA/VRSA, VRE, Streptococcus pneumoniae 
resistant to penicillin, 3GC and CR E. coli, 3GC and  
CR K. pneumoniae, and CR P. aeruginosa
25 000 
(Europe)
ECDC/EMEA Joint Technical 
Report, 2009
Centers for Disease 
Control and 
Prevention
Estimates based on 20 main 
sources of data
Clostridium difficile, CR Enterobacteriaceae, Neisseria 
gonorrhoeae, MDR Acinetobacter baumannii, 
Campylobacter spp, fluconazole-resistant Candida 
spp, ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, VRE, MDR 
P. aeruginosa, Salmonella spp, Shigella spp, MRSA, 
S. pneumoniae, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, VRSA, 
erythromycin-resistant group A streptococci, and  
clindamycin-resistant group B streptococci
23 000  
(United 
States)
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2013
Burden study report Estimates based on data from 
the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System
MRSA, glycopeptide-resistant Enterococcus spp, 3GC 
E. coli, 3GC K. pneumoniae, CR P. aeruginosa, CR 
K. pneumoniae, and CR A. baumannii
12 500  
(France)
Colomb-Cotinat et al, 2015
Antimicrobial 
Resistance Review
Prediction of the number of deaths 
due to 6 public health issues 
using several sources of data
E. coli, K. pneumoniae, S. aureus, HIV, malaria, and 
tuberculosis
10 million 
in 2050 
(worldwide)
O’Neill, 2014
Burden study group Estimates based on data from 
the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance System
Bloodstream infections due to MRSA and 3GC E. coli 8000 (Europe) De Kraker et al, 2011
Laxminarayan et al, 
2016
Analysis using estimates produced 
by Liu et al, 2015 [36] focusing 
on neonatal sepsis
Unspecified resistant pathogens responsible  
for neonatal sepsis
214 000 
(worldwide)
Laxminarayan et al, 2016
European Society of 
Clinical Microbiology 
and Infectious 
Diseases
No methodology available No methodology available 1 million 
in 2025 
(Europe)
10 000 (United 
Kingdom)
ESCMID, 2015
Centers for Disease 
Control and 
Prevention
Estimates based on data from the 
EIP-ABCs population-based sur-
veillance system
Invasive MRSA >11 000 
(United 
States)
Dantes et al, 2013
Laxminarayan et al, 
2013
Estimates based on risk factor 
analysis produced by Kayange 
et al, 2010 [37] focusing on neo-
natal deaths
ESBL Gram-negative bacteria and MRSA >58 000 (India) Laxminarayan et al, 2013
Abbreviations: 3GC, third-generation cephalosporin resistant; CR, carbapenem resistant; ECDC, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EIP-ABC, Emerging Infections 
Program–Active Bacterial Core; EMEA, European Medicines Agency; ESBL, extended-spectrum β-lactamase; ESCMID, European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases; 
HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; MDR, multidrug-resistant; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; NC, not calculated; VISA, vancomycin-intermediate Staphylococcus 
aureus; VRE, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus; VRSA, vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
aNumber of extra deaths due to antibiotic and/or antimicrobial resistance.
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Enterococcus faecalis, Enterococcus faecium, Klebsiella pneumo-
niae, Proteus mirabilis, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Staphylococcus 
aureus, Staphylococcus epidermidis, Streptococcus agalactiae, 
and Streptococcus pneumoniae) did not globally change or even 
decrease from 2001 to 2015 [15]. All these examples from the 
surveillance of antibiotic resistance on the local scale clearly 
demonstrate that the prevalence of resistance of bacteria to any 
given antibiotic is difficult to predict, as it depends on a multi-
plicity of biological, genetic, and ecological factors, creating a 
complex frame with high stochasticity [25]; therefore, estimates 
of extra deaths based on such data are highly speculative.
EXTENSIVELY DRUG-RESISTANT BACTERIA AND 
HUMAN EXTRA DEATHS
Recently, we decided to collect and analyze the results of 7 years 
of bacterial antibiotic resistance test performed in our clin-
ical microbiology laboratory, to determine the true impact of 
extensively drug-resistant (XDR) bacterial strains (ie, bacterial 
strains susceptible to <2 generic antibiotic compounds) on the 
mortality of patients hospitalized in our facility (representing 
1% of patients hospitalized in France). We focused our anal-
ysis on 10 bacterial species and genera of particular interest. 
Overall, we identified that 27 681 nonredundant bacterial infec-
tions due to the bacterial species of interest occurred over the 
study period, with 37 bacterial strains that were truly XDR. We 
then checked whether the 37 patients infected by the 37 XDR 
strains died in the 30 days following the infection. From this, 
we identified only 4 patients who met the criteria of inclusion. 
Looking their medical history in detail, we observed that all 
were admitted in intensive care units with comorbidities (1 for 
a hemorrhagic cerebellar stroke, 1 for septic shock, 1 for severe 
aortic valve endocarditis due to MRSA, and 1 for febrile respira-
tory distress worsened by cystic fibrosis) and that their deaths 
were not necessarily attributable to XDR bacterial infections. 
Although this analysis did not include case-controlled studies, 
which is a major limitation of our analysis, it allows us to con-
clude that, in our clinical experience, only 1 death was observed 
due to an XDR bacterial strain, which occurred in 2002 with an 
XDR Enterobacter aerogenes that became successively resistant 
to imipenem then colimycin, but which was still susceptible to 
gentamicin [26, 27]. The patient eventually died after a 10-week 
stay in the intensive care unit. The real role of the bacteria in 
the death of this patient is uncertain, but we certainly reached 
a therapeutic impasse of sorts and the patient died. In the lit-
erature, studies describing human deaths due to therapeutic 
impasses are scarce. Moreover, even in these cases, it is not clear 
whether or not the clinicians tested second-line antibiotics to 
treat the bacterial infections, as several useful antibiotics are no 
longer available [28], although they are effective against multi-
drug-resistant (MDR) bacteria [29]. One of the most striking 
examples of such efficacy is the successful use of antileprosy 
drugs in combination with other drugs to treat patients with 
pulmonary tuberculosis due to an XDR Mycobacterium tuber-
culosis strain [30]. Taken together, these observations clearly 
demonstrate that the relationship between XDR bacterial infec-
tions and mortality is difficult to determine, and that further 
analysis is needed to clarify this relationship.
WHAT SHOULD WE MAKE OF THE ALARMING 
ESTIMATES AND PREDICTIONS ABOUT ANTIBIOTIC 
RESISTANCE?
Comparing our observations to the estimates and predictions 
from the articles and reports mentioned in Table 2 [5–14], it 
is clear that authors are not analyzing true clinical microbiol-
ogy data. Thus, estimates of the number of extra deaths due 
to MDR bacterial infections are based solely on mathematical 
models and formulae. In any case, the real number of deaths 
attributable to MDR bacteria can be counted, as such data 
could easily be retrieved from hospital settings. Moreover, each 
of these reports uses a different definition of MDR bacteria, 
and the attributability of deaths to those bacteria were not ana-
lyzed. Thus, the alarmist messages presented in these reports 
usually concern 1 bacterial species for a given antibiotic (eg, 
resistance to carbapenems or colistin in gram-negative bacte-
ria), rather than resistance to a panel of antibiotics from differ-
ent classes [5–14].
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
Although clinical microbiology data and the results obtained 
from our analysis can be biased for several reasons, including 
the way data are extracted and analyzed and the fact that the 
bacterial epidemiology may vary from one place to another 
place, the local antibiotic resistance surveillance systems we 
have implemented in our institution, combined with our strat-
egy to test a large panel of antibiotics, including older antibiot-
ics against MDR bacteria, and the count of deaths associated 
with XDR, have enabled us to demonstrate that the current 
fears and alarmist reports both in the scientific community 
and in the media might be far removed from reality. The differ-
ence between our data and the estimates and predictions from 
the studied articles and reports [5–14] (Table 2) clearly raises 
the question of the usefulness of these predictive mathemati-
cal models and the quality of data that have been used to build 
them, as compared to empirical counting and observation of 
the realities on the ground. Indeed, modeling extra deaths using 
deductive models without actually counting the real number of 
deaths attributable to MDR bacteria does not reflect reality, and 
cannot be used as a standard, because there are many coun-
founding factors, such as emergence of new bacterial clones, 
comorbidities, local epidemiology, the availability of drugs, 
etc. Thus, it is impossible to predict the number of extra deaths 
based on exceedingly simple mathematical models when there 
are so many uncontrolled factors [31]. This is illustrated fairly 
well by Alice’s living croquet theory [32], borrowed from Lewis 
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Carroll’s game of “living croquet,” where the mallets are live 
pink flamingoes and the balls are live hedgehogs who behave 
unpredictably, making it impossible to predict the outcome of 
the game. It is the same with predicting extra deaths attributable 
to bacterial infections due to MDR bacteria, because trends of 
resistance to antibiotics are unpredictable, and many additional 
factors are currently unknown or misunderstood.
This raises the question of what can be done. In the past, 
some antibiotics, such as imipenem, were considered to be a 
“magic bullet,” explaining their overuse for decades. However, 
the recent emergence of carbapenemase-producing bacteria 
should prompt us to reconsider old drugs. Considering that it is 
still unclear how antibiotic-resistant bacterial infection impacts 
hospitalized patients, we believe that it is reasonable to recom-
mend (1) the adaptation of empirical therapeutic treatments 
to local antibiotic-resistance epidemiology; (2) the implemen-
tation of antibiotic stewardship to guarantee best therapeu-
tic usage; (3) the revival of our historical armamentarium of 
antibiotics, including those that are no longer distributed by 
drug companies; (4) the management of patients with bacterial 
infections in infectious diseases units in coordination with clin-
ical microbiologists; and (5) the implementation of laboratory 
data–based surveillance systems for the routine surveillance of 
antibiotic resistance. Such approaches have already been imple-
mented in our institute in its role as an experimental research 
hospital to fight bacterial infections, including infections due 
to MDR bacteria. The results from these ongoing approaches 
to patients with MDR bacterial infections will help us better 
understand how to manage such patients in the future.
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